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Building Integrity in Public Sector Operations 
Olivia Monaghan and Adam Graycar 
The Australian National University 
Corruption has been the focus of much academic scrutiny. Increasingly, these literatures are 
focusing on the role of corruption in effective governance and public administration 
(Anechiarico and Jacobs 1996; Brown and Head 2005; de Lancer Julnes and Villoria 2014; 
Della Porta 2004; Kim and Lee 2012; Larmour and Barcham 2006; Liu and Raine 2013; 
Menzel 2005; Mills 2012; Mulcahy 2012; Smith 2005; Warburton and Baker 2005). The three 
corrupt ‘behaviours’ of corruption, misconduct and maladministration are, in many ways, 
three sides of the same coin. All involve a misuse of office, all entail some deviation of public 
duty, and all contribute to political pressures and, in some cases, uncertainties. Their 
differences, however, should not be overlooked. In understanding these differences, and 
the various ways in which corruption, misconduct and maladministration manifest in public 
administration, integrity building processes can be incorporated into public sector 
operations.  
This Chapter focuses on this differentiation between the three phenomena – corruption, 
misconduct and maladministration – as a means through which more targeted integrity 
processes and preventive strategies can be built. It does this across three sections. First, it 
dissects the three phenomena so as to allow them to be better understood. Second, it 
identifies some challenges to organisational integrity. By considering the factors (both 
internal and external) that affect an organisation’s integrity, an organisational culture can be 
more effectively safeguarded. Third, this chapter identifies a number of integrity building 
processes and preventive strategies that can be easily adopted into an organisation’s 
operational system. An applicable, practical method of building integrity in the public sector 
reduces the risk of a band-aid approach being undertaken. Such an approach assumes that 
corruption, misconduct and maladministration take the same form in every organisation 
and that they can be targeted through a similar approach. Our analysis of the three 
phenomena at the start of this chapter highlights some of the problems with this 
assumption.   
Corruption, misconduct and maladministration are different types of unethical behaviour. 
When creating integrity building processes and preventative strategies for the public sector, 
these differences need to be understood and considered. The literature contains many 
definitions of corruption, with writers either seeking a comprehensive term or a focus on a 
particular topic. Morgan (1998, 11-12) notes the tendency towards a minimalist definition is 
because it is both concise and broad enough to be applied to most instances of corruption. 
The definition provided by the World Bank and Transparency International is an example of 
this, with corruption being defined as ‘the abuse of public office for private gain’ 
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(Transparency International 2013; Transparency International UK 2014; World Bank 1997; 
Larmour and Wolanin 2001). Where corruption, misconduct and maladministration differ, 
however, is in the notion of personal gain.  
This section will first expand upon the definitional aspects of the three phenomena, using 
definitions adopted in Australian legislation. Following this, it will highlight these definitional 
differences through the use of four examples – ‘Driving Licenses’, ‘Welfare Checks’ 
‘Soliciting Architecture’ and ‘Board of Elections’.  
 
 
Defining Corruption, Misconduct and Maladministration 
 
Perhaps the most commonly cited definition of corruption is the ‘abuse of public officer for 
private gain’ definition provided by the World Bank (1997) and Transparency International 
(2013) (and cited above). This is a clear concept – a public official who uses their office to 
receive a personal advantage. There remains, however, significant definitional debate 
surrounding the notion of corruption. The literature contains a number of views on what 
acts constitute corruption (Roebuck and Barker 1974; Transparency International UK 2014; 
Wood 1997; Graycar and Prenzler 2013), the causes of corruption (de Lancer Julnes and 
Villoria 2014; Mills 2012; Morgan 1998; Rose-Ackerman 1999; Treisman 2000), and how 
corruption in public administration can be best understood and approached (Gorta 2000, 
2006; Ede, Homel, and Penzler 2002; Findlay and Stewart 1992; Mills and Cooper 2007; 
Mulcahy 2012; de Lancer Julnes and Villoria 2014; Hooker 2009; Hossain, Musembi, and 
Hughes 2010; Redlawsk and McCann 2005). Further adding to the definitional discomfort is 
the fact that the major global convention on corruption, the United Nations Convention 
against Corruption (UNCAC) chooses not to define the phenomenon. (UNODC 2003). This 
Chapter will not detail definitional debates, other than to acknowledge the usefulness of 
allowing understandings of corruption to evolve so as to remain relevant to an ever-
changing phenomenon.   
Max Weber argued that analyses should not begin with a definition but should derive the 
definition by looking at specific examples, allowing a definition to be tailored to the 
purposes at hand (Klitgaard 1988; Weber 1958). It is this which this Chapter seeks to do – 
provide case studies of corruption, misconduct and maladministration which demonstrate 
the nuances of the phenomena. Through demonstrating how these three phenomena 
manifest and the differences in their manifestations we can create a sound basis from which 
preventive strategies can be drawn.  
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With this in mind, however, a provisional understanding of some of the legal definitions of 
corruption, misconduct and maladministration is important in creating an awareness of the 
architecture in which anti-corruption efforts operate. Through understanding the existing 
framework, reforms can be tailored to produce a best ‘fit’ for the purpose required.  
There are a number of existing anti-corruption agencies in Australia, both independent and 
state-run, most of which operate under different protocols and legislations. This makes 
providing any cohesive definitions for corruption, misconduct and maladministration 
difficult. Nonetheless, these definitions provide clear understandings of the general 




The New South Wales ICAC is Australia’s oldest independent anti-corruption organisation. 
According to Sections 7, 8 and 9 of their Act, corrupt conduct occurs when: 
 A public official improperly uses, or tries to improperly use, the knowledge, power or 
resources of their position for personal gain or the advantage of others 
 A public official acts dishonestly or unfairly, or breaches public trust 
 A member of the public influences, or tries to influence, a public official to use his or 
her position in a way that is dishonest, biased, or breaches public trust 
(NSW 1988) 
This definition shows that corruption can involve more than a misuse of office for personal 
gain. By also encompassing ‘the advantage of others’, it demonstrates that personal gain 
does not necessitate lining your own pockets. Further, by including the notion of breaching 
public trust, this definition shows that corruption in public administration ultimately relates 
to a deviation from proper and official conduct.  
 
Misconduct 
This notion of deviating from official conduct is central to the legal definitions of misconduct 
in Australia. The definition of serious misconduct as adopted by Regulation 1.07 of the Fair 
Work Regulations (2009) is conduct that includes: 
 Wilful or deliberate behaviour from an employee that is inconsistent with the 
contract of their employment; 
 Conduct that causes serious or imminent risk to the health of safety of a 
person or the reputation, viability or profitability of the employer’s business; 
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 The employee, in the course of the employee’s engagement, engaging in 
theft, or fraud, or assault; 
 The employee being intoxicated at work; 
 The employee refusing to carry out a lawful and reasonable instruction that is 
consistent with the terms of the employee’s contract of employment.  
This can be reduced to conduct that causes serious and imminent risk to the health, safety, 
reputation, viability or profitability of the employer’s business.  
 
Maladministration 
The South Australian Independent Commissioner Against Corruption Act (2012) is one of the 
few pieces of anti-corruption legislation in Australia that outlines the offence of 
maladministration. According to Section 5 of the Act, maladministration is: 
 Conduct of a public officer or practice, policy or procedure of a public authority that 
results in irregular and unauthorised use of public money, or 
 Conduct of a public officer involving substantial mismanagement in or in relation to 
the performance of official functions. 
(Government of South Australia 2012) 
 
This definition shows that, despite involving a deviation of official duties, there is scope for 
the act of maladministration to be unintentional – finances can be mismanaged as a result 
of incompetence, not intent. Further to this, there is no specification of personal gain in the 
above definition of maladministration.  
 
Applying definitions to cases 
As the following three examples demonstrate, corruption involves clear intent to deviate 
from one’s duties for a personal gain. In the examples of misconduct and maladministration, 
however, the intent is not necessary, and personal gain was not a desired outcome. These 
nuances make it problematic to apply traditional anti-corruption strategies to public services 
affected by misconduct or maladministration and expect positive reform.  
Four examples are included below – one each for corruption and maladministration, and 
two for misconduct. Two examples are provided for misconduct (‘Welfare Checks’ and 
‘Soliciting Architecture’) to demonstrate the nuances of the phenomenon. Notably, the two 
examples are chosen to illustrate the role of intent in integrity breaches; whereas in some 
cases of corruption, misconduct and maladministration, such as bribery of an official, intent 
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plays a clear and active role, in others the public official may be of the opinion that they are 
acting with integrity when they are in fact acting outside the rules of an organisation or the 
laws of a state.  
 
Corruption 
 Driving Licenses 
In 2007, a manager of the Roads and Transport Authority (RTA) – the agency responsible for 
driving licenses – in New South Wales, Australia, was found by the New South Wales ICAC 
(ICAC 2007) to have corruptly issued drivers licences to individuals who failed to meet RTA 
standards. The manager, Paul MacPherson, failed to sight adequate identification, issued 
licenses to those who had failed their practical tests, and gave test answers to individuals in 
exchange for payments in either cash or marijuana. 
Mr MacPherson was also found to have approached a driving instructor, Komate 
Jaturawong, and established a system of collusion. Between December 2002 and August 
2006, the Commission found that Mr McPherson colluded with Mr Jaturawong to 
improperly provide the correct answers to licence applicants undertaking the driver 
knowledge test and unfairly advantage applicants undergoing a practical driving test (ICAC 
2007). The Commission also found that Mr Jaturawong sought and received cash payments 
from licence applicants as a reward or inducement for arranging the provision of unlawful 
assistance to them by Mr McPherson during the driver knowledge test and practical driving 
test (ICAC 2007). As a result of the ICAC’s investigation, MacPherson was jailed for 3 years 
for corruption, and Mr Jaturawong received 20 months for aiding and abetting. 
Considering the above definition of corruption as when a “public official improperly uses, or 
tries to improperly use, the knowledge, power or resources of their position for personal 
gain or the advantage of others” (NSW 1988), this this is a clear case of corruption. Both Mr 
MacPherson and Mr Jaturawong have abused their positions for personal gain. They acted 
with intent in deviating from their duties, breached public trust, and engaged in an 
unauthorised trading of their entrusted authority. 
 
Misconduct  
 Welfare Checks 
In 2007, a Victorian police patrol attended a residence to conduct a routine welfare check 
on a woman who had recently attempted suicide. At the end of his shift, one of the officers, 
Officer Quach, returned to the residence in plain clothes and with some groceries. The 
woman (unnamed in the verdict) was aware the Quach was a police officer (Supreme Court 
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of Victoria - Court of Appeal 2010). Intimate activity occurred, involving the officer 
ultimately abusing his position and her vulnerability.  
What makes this a clear example of misconduct is the fact that the officer would not have 
known of the woman and would not have been able to abuse his power had it not been for 
his job as a public official. Although he was off duty, and despite the offer of goodwill in 
bringing the groceries, Quach used the power awarded him by his job to take advantage of 
the woman’s vulnerability. Further, as Justice Redlich stated in his verdict, the 
“use of knowledge or information acquired by the office holder in the course of his or 
her duties for a private or other impermissible purpose may be inconsistent with the 
responsibilities of the office and calculated to injure the public interest.” 
      (Supreme Court of Victoria - Court of Appeal 2010).  
This is consistent with the above definition of misconduct, whereby the wilful behaviour is 
inconsistent with the terms of employment and negatively impacts the reputation of the 
organisation. 
 
 Soliciting Architecture 
In 2013, a Construction Project Manager for the New York City Department of Housing 
Preservation and Development (HPD), Patrick Enright, solicited an architect and a 
construction labourer over whose work he had authority to perform architectural and 
carpentry services at his daughter’s home and at his summer home. In each case, the work 
was performed and paid for (DOI 2013). The manager in question was found to have 
violated a section (2604 (b)(3)) of the City’s conflict of interest law (New York City 1986) 
stating: 
No public servant shall use or attempt to use his or her position as a public servant 
to obtain any financial gain, contract, license, privilege or other private or personal 
advantage, direct or indirect, for the public servant or any person or firm associate 
with the public servant. 
In this case, despite an absence of any evidence that Enright received any special treatment 
from the person or firm whose work was solicited, he was found to have misused his 
connections to obtain a personal benefit. The above section of the conflict of interest law 
safeguards against the possibility that a public servant’s judgement with respect to the 
public matter over which he or she has authority will be compromised because of the 
business relationship that he or she has established with the private party involved in the 
matter. This prohibition means that Enright had the entire pool of architects and carpenters 
in the metropolitan area available to him, except those with whom he dealt in his City work. 
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This case is different to the two presented above in so much as there was no evidence to 
suggest that Enright intentionally misused his position – he paid for the architectural work, 
received no special treatment and did not take advantage of anyone as a result of his 
position. Where this case is similar to that of Welfare Checks is in the misuse of knowledge 
gained in the course of one’s official duty. As Enright used the connections obtained during 
the course of his official work for an advantage he placed himself in a position whereby he 
had a private business relationship with one of the contractors whose work he was duty-
bound to oversee, risking the reputation and viability of the employer’s business. 
Given that Enright paid for the services of the architect and carpenter and that the harms 
were minimal – it was an act committed out of convenience rather than a desire for 
personal advancement – this activity might not be regarded as inappropriate or be seen as 
misconduct in many jurisdictions. The arrangement between Enright and those whose work 
he solicited did, however, create the perception of possible favourable treatment in 
assessing their future work.  
 
Maladministration  
 Board of Elections (New York City) 
In April 2013, the New York City Board of Elections (BOE) was found by the Department of 
Investigations (DOI) to have wasted at least $2.4 million of NYC funds by failing to 
consolidate election districts and to reduce staffing numbers during the 2011 off-year 
elections (DOI and Hearn 2013). In advance of the election, the BOE was warned of low 
turnout at public hearings and in the media and was urged to consolidate districts, which it 
is legally permitted to do when anticipated voter turnout is low, and which had been done 
in the past (DOI and Hearn 2013). 
The BOE ignored the risks, and fully staffed its polling sites with 28,279 workers assigned to 
6,102 election districts. Approximately 90% of the 1,357 polling sites in the 5 boroughs had 
10 or fewer voters for every poll worker assigned. There was an average turnout of six 
voters for every poll worker, and at least 12 sites had more poll workers than voters. 
In this case, the BOE ignored the identified risks and acted poorly in the administration of its 
duties resulting in a significant financial loss to the City (DOI and Hearn 2013).  
The financial mismanagement in this case resulting from BOE ignoring the risks makes this a 
clear case of maladministration. While the use of public money by the BOE was authorised, 
the loss of $2.4 million is in accordance with the above definition of maladministration 
‘conduct of a public officer involving substantial mismanagement in or in relation to the 




Precipitating factors in the literature 
The notion of corruption and risk being linked is echoed by Mills and Cooper (2007) who 
classify corruption risk factors as being either individual, institutional or environmental. 
These factors (individual, institutional and environmental) are not mutually exclusive in 
contributing to corrupt conduct. They are often found to coexist and/or interact with each 
other. Mills and Cooper’s (2007) analysis of corruption risk factors are drawn from an 
analysis of cases investigated by the New South Wales ICAC.  
This section will focus on Mills and Cooper’s (2007) three corruption risk factors – individual, 
institutional and environmental. Following this, these precipitating factors will be applied to 
the case studies to demonstrate how precipitating factors can be targeted when drafting 
integrity building strategies and preventive measures.  
 
Individual Factors 
In their analysis of cases investigated by the New South Wales ICAC, Mills & Cooper (2007) 
found that the most common activities where public officials acted alone in corruption were 
contracting, engaging in secondary employment and regulating (licensing and certification).  
However they also found that corrupt public officials are more likely to be managers or 
elected officials than staff without supervisory or management functions. Out of the 63 
investigations considered between 1988 and 2006, 30 involved findings of corrupt conduct 
against public sector managers or supervisors, and 10 were against elected officials (Mills 
and Cooper 2007).  
In regards to corrupt behaviours with individual perpetrators, Mills and Cooper (2007) 
determined that the most common behaviours were acceptance of bribes, gifts and secret 
commissions and collusion. These mostly related to relationships between public officials 
and those outside the public sector.  
Individual relationships were found to be important, with it being concluded that 
relationships facilitate corruption by providing the opportunity for exchange of power 
between individuals who are looking for ways to get something they want (Mills and Cooper 
2007). The corruption risk is enhanced when the public official in question has regulatory or 
decision-making authority, and if they had a pre-existing relationship with their non-public 
sector accomplice. Another common scenario involved public sector perpetrators who had 
developed inappropriate relationships with clients whom they had met through their work 
(Mills and Cooper 2007). 
Also, people who are more dependent on their employing organisation, in the sense that 
they have few options for alternative employment, are more likely to engage in unethical 
behaviours that they see as vital to protecting or enhancing their career. Further, individuals 
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with a dependence on alcohol or gambling are also at risk for corrupt practices. The same is 
said for those who feel dissatisfied or perceive unfairness in their workplace (Mills and 
Cooper 2007). 
So, from this analysis we can determine that a number of factors create corruption risks for 
individual perpetrator; namely, the amount of discretion and autonomy their position holds, 
the level of power afforded them by their position, pre-existing relationships, job insecurity 
or dissatisfaction, and individual dependency issues (such as with drugs, alcohol, gambling 
etc.).  
In a study of corruption in New York City, Graycar & Villa (2011) found that, of the 100 cases 
examined, three-quarters were of people acting alone. This is not to say that organised 
corruption did not exist or was not found, rather to highlight the strength of individual 
factors in encouraging acts corruption, misconduct and maladministration.  
 
Institutional Factors 
Mills and Cooper (2007) found that organisations are more susceptible to unethical conduct 
when the individual role of the employee is uncertain or the organisation is destabilised in 
some way. For example, organisations were found to be at risk if they are large, intensely 
competitive (both internally and externally), prioritise the bottom line, operate in industries 
or sectors with a culture of misconduct, and are experiencing a state of dynamic change 
such as corporate restructuring or diversification. Financial problems faced by the 
organisation may also be related to, and encourage, unethical conduct (Mills and Cooper 
2007). 
There are two types of internal factors that might influence employee conduct: system 
failures (ie. poor supervision, oversight, or procedural rules) and socialisation factors (ie. 
conduct of peers and management within an organisation). System failures involve cases 
where the agencies had no policies or procedures that addressed the conduct, or where 
perpetrators failed to follow adequate procedures but the failure was not identified because 
monitoring was inadequate. In some cases, agencies had adopted policies and procedures, 
but they were so complex or outdated that they made it easier for employees to engage in 
corruption and harder for managers to supervise or monitor their activities because it was 
not clear how things should be done (Mills and Cooper 2007). 
Socialisation factors mostly relate to poor supervision and management. Two forms were 
identified. One, organisational incompetence, involve cases where there is a failure to 
monitor performance, implementation, and supervision. The second relates to how 
management responds to ethical issues. This includes behaviour on the part of managers 
that tolerate or reward unethical behaviour, not acting on corruption and behaving 
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inconsistently, and emphasising the bottom line of the organisation over other values (Mills 
and Cooper 2007). 
When a number of staff are found to have acted inappropriately within the one 
organisation, it was mostly in an environment where they were not effectively supervised 
and were allowed a high degree of autonomy. They were also frequently highly trusted and 
respected for their knowledge, and were thus allowed to assume high levels of personal 
discretion as a result of seniority, long-service, trust and popularity (Mills and Cooper 2007). 
From this analysis we can determine that there are particular elements of an organisational 
culture that contribute to institutional corruption. These are: the size of the organisation, 
the degree to which competition is valued and expected, the importance of the bottom line 
as a key performance indicator, an uncertain future for the organisation, poor supervision 
and management, the way management demonstrates its stance against corrupt 
behaviours, impracticability of existing codes of conduct or integrity measures and 
stagnation in leadership.  
 
Environmental Factors 
According to Mills and Cooper (2007), environmental factors are those that originate in the 
environment in which the organisation operates and have a demonstrable impact on it 
while being outside the control of the agency. Some of these factors are: potential for 
significant personal gain (financial or otherwise), a highly competitive working environment, 
the nature of the agency’s work, significant change imposed on the organisation (ie 
organisational restructure, allocation of new funds by the government, the need to operate 
on a commercial basis), inadequate legislative provisions, poor understanding of proper 
agency functioning by some sectors of the community. 
Operating in a competitive environment – such as regulation of property development, 
liquor licensing or universities competing to attract students – can result in an environment 
that has a tendency to see increased profits as a goal orientation, without consideration of 
organisational values (Mills and Cooper 2007).  
Preventative measures targeting environmental factors should thus consider the ethical 
standards of those engaged in third-party contracting by an organisation, as well as the 







Building integrity processes and preventive strategies 
 
Daniel Kaufmann, former Director of the World Bank Institute, recently stated ‘we can no 
longer fight corruption by simply fighting corruption alone’ (Kaufmann 2012). It is with this 
in mind that these integrity building processes and preventive strategies are designed. The 
processes and strategies are created to allow for an easier tailoring of integrity reform 
within an organisation. In this sense, the processes and strategies ‘fit’ with the categories of 
‘individual’, ‘institutional’, and ‘environmental’ factors as outlined by Mills and Cooper 
(2007). The integrity building processes focus on the restructuring the values and goals of an 
organisation, and how these can be best communicated to employees and relating publics. 
Preventive strategies, however, focus on methods an organisation can adopt to minimise 
the risk of corruption. 
These processes and strategies are designed to assist a situational approach to reducing 
levels of corrupt behaviours in an organisation. Not every process and strategy will apply to 
each case of corruption. For example, if misconduct is the main corrupt activity occurring in 
a workplace, it would be pointless to adopt strategies targeting bribery.  
This section outlines some Integrity Building Processes (Table 1) and Preventive Strategies 
(Table 2) that can be adopted to target levels of corruption, misconduct and 
maladministration in public administration. These processes and strategies have been 
adapted from a number of different sources, both public (Crime and Corruption Commission 
2008; Crime and Misconduct Commission 2013; ICAC 2014, 2001; OPI 2009; ICAC 2002; NSW 
Auditor-General 2006; Queensland Police Service 2013; Robinson and Queensland Transport 
2007) and private (Goodson, Mory, and Lapointe 2012; McCusker 2006; University of 
Western Sydney 2010) sectors. They are here provided as a guide to tailoring a ‘best fit’ 
approach to integrity reform.  
This section will first outline the identified Integrity Building Strategies and Preventive 
Measures before demonstrating how they support Mills and Cooper’s (2007; Mills 2012) 
precipitating factors. The four case studies of Driving Licences, Welfare Checks, Soliciting 
Architecture and Board of Elections will be used to demonstrate how Mills and Cooper’s 
(2007) factors in addition to the Integrity Building Strategies and Preventive Measures can 
create a multi-angulated approach to reducing levels of corruption in public administration 
systems.  
 
Integrity Building Processes 
The following processes have been adapted from a number of reports written by Australian 
independent and state-run anti-corruption organisations, in addition to research conducted 
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into integrity processes in an Australian state government (Crime and Corruption 
Commission 2008; Crime and Misconduct Commission 2013; ICAC 2001; OPI 2009). Not all 
are appropriate in every circumstance, and these can be used to form a technique bank 
from which one can draw a diagnosis of a problem.  
Table 1: Integrity Building Processes 
Individual Factors 
 Include integrity issues in induction, education and awareness programs 
 Include integrity issues in organisational discussions 
 Establish leadership mentoring programs that focus on integrity issues 
 Clearly communicate the people management resources available to leadership and  
ensure that they are used appropriately 
 Ensure leadership takes responsibility for their team 
 Ensure leadership effectively manages work performance issues as they arise and that 
outcomes are communicated to all parties involved 
Institutional Factors 
 Evaluate current organisational culture through ongoing review 
 Use structured anonymous surveys to evaluate organisational culture 
 Use survey results to identify implementation issues or possible areas for improvement 
 Establish clear and reasonable behavioural expectations through codes of conduct, 
performance and building processes 
 Involve all employees in the development of organisational values to ensure they are 
practical and consistent 
 Establish a system of confidential reporting of issues 
 Adopt and internal communication plan that reinforces behavioural standards and 
outlines how they are enforced 
 Employ values and public interest principles in recruitment, selection and performance 
review criteria 
 Establish a system for screening potential employees, suppliers and/or customers 
 Consider public interest when reviewing internal policies and procedures 
 Utilize systems of mentoring and review to ensure public resources are used 
appropriately and effectively 
Environmental Factors 
 Ensure decision making processes are transparent to the public and open to review 
 Make copies of organisational values, codes of conduct, complaints and disciplinary 
policies publically available 
 Communicate the importance of organisational values to key stakeholders 
Source: (Adopted from Crime and Corruption Commission 2008; Crime and Misconduct Commission 
2013; ICAC 2001; OPI 2009) 
 
Preventive Measures 
These Preventive Measures have also been adapted from a number of Australian 
independent and state-based anti-corruption institutions (ICAC 2002, 2014; McCusker 2006; 
13 
 
NSW Auditor-General 2006; Robinson and Queensland Transport 2007; Queensland Police 
Service 2013; University of Western Sydney 2010; Graycar and Sidebottom 2012), and have 
been explored in Graycar and Sidebottom (2012).  
The Preventive Measures target the roots of corruption, misconduct and maladministration 
in a given organisation. By categorising them into individual, institutional and environmental 
factors, it becomes easy to see how these factors encourage or facilitate corruption and the 
different ways in which these factors can be addressed.  
Table 2: Preventive Measures 
Individual Factors 
 Support those who identify corruption or unethical behaviour 
 Provide specialist support services to all staff members, eg. alcohol, drug and gambling 
support, Senior Human Support Officers, pastors 
 Recognise good work, encourage and reward good work practices 
 Provide customised training to staff involved in cash handling 
Institutional Factors 
 Utilise risk management and regularly review operational risks 
 Consider the risks faced and identified by similar organisations 
 Address the corruption prevention outcomes your organisation wants to achieve, identify 
what your organisation is already doing to achieve these outcomes, and target the gap 
between where you are and where you want to be 
 Engage all staff in the creation of integrity policies, procedures and systems to ensure 
they are practical 
 Maintain a database of corrupt or unethical incidents and regularly review to identify 
emerging patterns or trends 
 Strengthen an ethical culture through training, education and public accountability 
 Relevant staff receive regular training in the agency’s procurement processes 
 Establish effective and appropriate complaint management 
 Encourage staff to report misconduct, corruption or maladministration 
 Embed ethical standards into the recruitment strategies of Human Resources 
 Establish systems of promotion that consider demonstrated ethical conduct 
 Minimise internal competition 
 Undertake regular research into corruption prevention strategies 
Environmental Factors 
 Demonstrate public accountability by providing appropriate, accurate and timely 
information to the government and public 
 Engage in procurement planning to manage purchasing patterns 
 Incorporate monitoring and evaluation of performance of contractors and products into 
each tender or purchasing decision 
 Communicate proper organisational functioning to both staff and public  
 Allow for scrutiny and review of systems and practices 
 Focus on public accountability and duty rather than bottom line 
Source: (Adapted from ICAC 2002, 2014; McCusker 2006; NSW Auditor-General 2006; Robinson and 
Queensland Transport 2007; Queensland Police Service 2013; University of Western Sydney 2010) 
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Applying Processes and Strategies to Opening Vignettes 
If we consider the opening examples of corruption, misconduct and maladministration, we 
can see how these processes and strategies are applied.  
 
Driving Licenses (Corruption) 
For example, in the case of the RTA manager accepting cash and drugs to pass people who 
would otherwise have failed their licence or who failed to provide insufficient identification, 
individual factors were at play. The manager was not prompted into corrupt behaviour from 
a rotten culture – he saw a scheme and he went with it. The bribes were being paid to 
circumvent the policies and systems of the organisation, but because applicants did not 
meet the standards, not because the policies and systems were overly arduous or complex.  
The following preventative strategies can be applied to this case: Provide specialist support 
services to all staff members; Recognise good work, encourage and reward good work 
practices. 
Integrity building processes relevant to this case are those focusing on Human Resources 
and incentivising proper conduct. Processes that emphasise public interest are not entirely 
relevant to this case because the activities of the individual in question benefited a 
particular public (those attempting to sit their driving test). As such, the relevant processes 
are: 
1. Include integrity issues in induction, education and awareness programmes. If 
standards of promotion involve demonstrated proper behaviour, this will help 
negate the risk of individuals seeking bribes. Further, by demonstrating that the 
organisation is serious about integrity, employees may be deterred from engaging in 
corruption in the future. 
2. Establish a system for screening potential employees, suppliers and customers. This 
point is really limited to ‘screening potential employees’ in this case. This individual 
was employed to score driving tests; as such, the organisation has little control over 
who the customer is, they could be anyone sitting a test. However, incorporating 
integrity standards into recruitment through interview questions would flag 
potential rotten apples. 
3. Clearly communicate the people management resources available to leadership, and 
ensure they are used correctly.  In this case, the individual involved was a manager. 
However by communicating to his superiors the people management resources 
available, suspect or problematic behaviour may have been addressed sooner. 
 
Welfare Checks (Misconduct) 
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Individual factors are clearly present in this example of misconduct. The police officer in 
question acted alone in misusing information obtained through his position (the existence, 
location and vulnerability of the woman) to then return to the property after work and out 
of uniform. While in the past the institutional trappings of being a police officer may have 
given license for all sorts of inappropriate behaviour, that is not the case now and it is 
unlikely that institutional factors would have played a role here (unless there were deep 
seated, localised cultures of corruption). Institutionally, it could be that the officer was not 
given enough training on ethical conduct and was therefore not aware of proper conduct, 
but this is more likely an individual case of misconduct. Given the existence and promotion 
of codes of conduct in the Victorian police force and that the officer has targeted a 
vulnerable individual, it is reasonable to assume that further promoting the behavioural 
guidelines of the police force would have done little to prevent this act from occurring. 
As such, the following preventative strategies can be applied to this case: Provide specialist 
support to all officers; Utilise risk management and regularly review operational risks. 
Integrity building processes focus on Human Resources, staff management and incentivising 
good conduct: 
1. Include integrity issues in induction, education and awareness programmes. Not only 
does this demonstrate that the organisation is committed to best practice, but it 
allows staff members to raise any questions they may have about proper conduct. 
2. Establish clear and reasonable behavioural expectations through codes of conduct, 
performance measures and business processes. Although in this case the 
organisation has a well-established and well-promoted set of behavioural guidelines, 
ensuring that they are both reasonable and understood amongst all employees and 
ensuring that promotion considers good practice, incentivises good behaviour.  
3. Employ values and public interest principles in recruitment, selection and 
performance review criteria. This allows Human Resources to risk assess any future 




As the architect and carpenter agreed to engage in the work, and as Enright acted alone but 
not from a desire to seek special treatment, the factors involved in this case are a mixture of 
individual, institutional and environmental.  
Applicable preventive strategies are: Recognise good work, encourage and reward good 
work practices; Provide customised training to staff involved in cash handling; Utilise risk 
management and regularly review operational risks; Engage all staff in the creation of 
integrity policies, procedures and systems to ensure they are practical; Strengthen an ethical 
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culture through training, education and public accountability; Incorporate monitoring and 
evaluation of performance of contractors and products into each tender or purchasing 
decision; Communicate proper organisational functioning to both staff and the public. 
As Enright was not found to have achieved any special treatment from the architect and 
carpenter, and that the only advantage he received from his public office was knowledge of 
the work of these individuals, it suggests that integrity building strategies should focus on 
education and awareness. Further as no public resources were diverted or mismanaged in 
this case, integrity building strategies focusing on public accountability and resource 
management are not applicable. Applicable strategies are: 
1. Involve all employees in the development of organisational values to ensure that 
they are practical and consistent. This ensures that staff members are aware of 
behavioural standards while providing an opportunity for leadership to become 
aware of any risks caused by impractical policies. 
2. Adopt an internal communication plan that reinforces behavioural standards and 
outlines how they are enforced. This can be in the form of advertising – ie. on 
noticeboards, via email – or through less formal forms of communication such as 
conversations with immediate supervisors.  
3. Include integrity issues in induction, education and awareness programmes. 
Providing employees with situational cases to “solve” or respond to can create 
awareness of the more complex elements of existing laws and regulations.  
4. Establish leadership mentoring programmes that focus on integrity issues. This 
allows employees to raise questions they may have about proper conduct with 
superiors confidentially and without fear of reprimand.  
5. Communicate the importance of organisational values to key stakeholders. This can 
be achieved either through ensuring that clients and stakeholders meet 
ethics/integrity standards – ie. have their own code of ethics – or can involve the 




Board of Elections, NYC (Maladministration) 
The fact that this case involved financial mismanagement and the organisational disregard 
to identified risks points to institutional factors.  
As such, the applicable preventative strategies are: Utilise risk management and regularly 
review operational risks; Strengthen an ethical culture through training, education and 
public accountability.  
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Only two preventative strategies are applicable here for a number of reasons. First, it was 
poor decision-making by leadership not widespread malpractice that caused the case of 
maladministration. Second, the nature of the BOE is such that it does not rely on practices 
of tendering or procurement and the “key stakeholders” are the public who use its services. 
Third, the BOE did demonstrate public accountability and did allow for scrutiny and review 
by holding public hearings, it just chose to ignore all suggestions. This places the onus on 
BOE leadership. In this case, utilising and properly responding to risk management and 
strengthening the ethical culture at the top are the only applicable preventative strategies. 
In order to ensure that the BOE continues to effectively and efficiently use public resources 
in the future, the following integrity building processes can be adopted: 
1. Evaluate current organisational culture through ongoing review. This can be 
achieved through the use of anonymous surveys. By establishing systems of 
anonymous, ongoing review you create a leadership that responds to the concerns 
of its employees and the leadership team is able to identify implementation issues or 
other possible areas of improvement. This ensures that the leadership culture is one 
which regularly considers best practice.  
2. Consider public interest when reviewing internal policies and procedures. “Public 
interest” can here refer to both the issues that arise in public forums and the 
taxpayer dollar. Considering both will reinforce the notion of public duty. 
3. Establish a system of confidential professional reporting of issues. This allows staff 
members to flag efficiency or practical concerns of which leadership may otherwise 
be unaware. 
4. Ensure decision making processes are transparent to the public and open to review. 
This further ensures that an organisation is committed to risk management and 
being responsible to the public. 
5. Utilize systems of monitoring and review to ensure public resources are used 
appropriately and effectively. Same as above.  
Ensure leadership actively manages work performance issues as they arise and that 
outcomes are communicated to all parties involved. If parties are private individuals, 
communication can occur in private. If, in this case, the parties involved are the public, the 
DOI, the City and the media, communicating review outcomes via a public forum (such as 
the media or the BOE website) shows that the organisation is committed to reform and that 







All cases of corruption, misconduct and maladministration are not the same. Classifying 
cases by Type, Activity, Sector and Place often assists in understanding the context and 
nature of events. Most public services are delivered ethically and professionally and, where 
breaches occur, they result from different conditions sometimes facilitated by individual, 
institutional or environmental weaknesses. It is impossible to write a law or policy for every 
possible scenario in which corruption, misconduct and maladministration might occur. With 
this impossibility in mind, it becomes important to build integrity so people have a sense of 
what is acceptable and what is not. Building preventive strategies that are general and can 
be applied in specific cases allows for an easily adopted model of corruption, misconduct 
and maladministration prevention. This chapter has illustrated, with some real life 
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